Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

Rochelle Ritchie Wilson v. Robert Gaines Wilson :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Appellant;
Kay M. Lewis; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wilson v. Wilson, No. 15277 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/696

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPP£ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROCHELLE RITCHIE WILSON,
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.
ROBERT GAINES NILSON,

Case

no.

15277

DefendantAppellant.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEI1ENT OF THE CASE
A.

Uature of the Case.

This is an appeal from that portion of the Decree
of Divorce entered in the court below that ordered the distribution of the marital estate property and the payment
of alimony to Plaintiff-Respondent.

Defendant-Appellant,

a doctor of medicine, claims on appeal that the trial court
was in error in not awarding him a bigger piece of the marital
estate pie and in requiring him to pay alimony to

~rs.

Wilson,

the Plaintiff, in the sum of $900.00 a month.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Because of the complexity and size of the marital
estate here in question, this case required the better part
o~

three days of trial, almost all of which was devoted to
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the presentation of evidence and testimony regarding the
nature, extent and distribution of the marital estate.

On

February 4, 1977, midway through the trial, the court entered
its Partial Decree of Divorce (R.

76) '"herein /1rs.

~hlson,

Respondent, was granted a divorce against Appellant on the
grounds that Dr. Wilson had announced to her on occasion that
he did not love her, that he had fallen in love with another
woman (his best friend's wife) whom he wanted to marry, and,
although Respondent pleaded for an opportunity to attempt
to salvage the marriage, Appellant would not be dissuaded
from pursuing his announced course of action

(Green TR. 70,

11. 12-30; 71' 11. 1-11).

After taking additional testimony and evidence with
respect to the nature, extent and proposed distribution of

t~e

marital estate, the court entered its final Decree of Divorce
as to Property Distribution on Xay 6, 1977

(R. 129), •.1herein

property •.vas distributed and alimony al<arded as hereinafter
described.
C.

Relief Sought on Appeal.

The judgment of the trial court should be affir~ed
and ~espondent should be awarded a reasonable attorney's ~ee
incurred in defending this appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

D.

3 -

Statement of Facts.

The parties to this action met and married at the
outset of Dr. Nilson's medical career on August 27, 1969.
Although both had children from a previous marriage, no
issue was born to this union.

When Respondent married Dr.

Wilson, she was 33 years of age

(Red TR. 43); at the time

the final decree was entered, she was 41.
Notwithstanding Appellant's description of money
and property contributed by each at the outset of their
marriage (Brief of Appellant, 3), Respondent's net worth
contribution exceeded that of Dr. Wilson; in fact his contribution was of a negative nature.
Although Appellant is careful to enumerate in
his brief the value of his assets at the outset of this
marriage, he conveniently omits to mention the extent of
his concurrent debts and obligations as well.

Dr. Wilson

testified that he contributed the following assets to this
marriage:

an automobile valued at approximately 53,500.00

(Green TR. 28), a down payment on a house in the sum of
SlO, 000.00

(Green TR. 28, 11. 10-18)

(note that following

the trial Appellant submitted a statement indicating that
SlS,OOO.OO had been paid rather than $10,000.00) and office
equipment valued at $2, OOIJ. 00

(Green TR. 48).

'lo mention
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is made, however, that he owed the estate of his father

S20,aoc.:

for an obligation incurred prior to this marriage, and, in
fact, after the filing of the complaint and during the pendency
of this action he withdrew money from the joint account of
these parties and liquidated that obligation (Green TR. 58,
11. 11-30; 59, 11. 1-17; Red TR. 42, 11. 7-12).

On another

occasion during the pendency of this action as well, Appellant
paid $5,000.00 to an education trust set up for the benefit
of his sons from his prior marriage, which payment constituted
a contribution to a continuing obligation which he brought
with him to this marriage (Green TR. 65, 11. 5-26).
Furthermore, Appellant brought to this marriage an
obligation to pay $500.00 per month in child support for the
maintenance of his two sons.

He was obligated to purchase and

maintain life and health insurance for their benefit, in
addition to having to provide funds for all education that
either son might desire or need beyond

~igh

school, includina

graduate and professional schools.
Although Respondent came to this marriage with
no areat storehouse of riches, she at least entered it debtfree.

vfuereas Appellant entered the marriage with an

obligation to pay child support,

~espondent

entered the

marriage with the right to receive child support.

N~ereas

Appellant entered the marriage ~ith deb~s and obliaations ir
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excess of the value of his assets, Respondent entered the
marriage with no debts and obligations and assets of practical
use and value including a washer, a dryer, a sewing machine,
silver and other household items such as pots, pans and dishes.
During the course of this marriage, Dr. Wilson pursued
his medical career while Mrs. Wilson attended to her household
chores at horne.

Over the years of this marriage, his practice

developed and generated income growth of a rapid and substantial
nature.

His income for the year of 1969 was $24,129.95 (Red

TR. 11. 6-10; P. Ex. #1); presently his salary is, exclusive
of income from other business interests and investments, in
excess of $100,000.00 annually (Brief of Appellant, 17).
At the time of their marriage, these people understood
and assumed certain obligations with respect to the children
of each from their prior marriages.

Dr. Wilson, for example

understood that inasmuch as Respondent had custody of her two
children, they would reside with her.

He assumed the obli-

gation of contributing to their support as well as that of
~espondent.

Mrs. Wilson, on the other hand, understood

that, although Appellant's former wife had custody of his
two children, they, as well as other family members, would
stay with them from time to time.
~o

In addition to attending

her normal wifely chores and obligations of cooking, cleaning,
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shopping, etc., she accommodated Appellant's family members on
many occasions.

His sons stayed with them for one month in the

summertime of each year, during which time she not only
assisted in taking care of them, but accompanied them, with
their father, on camping trips and other vacation excursions
(Green TR. 17, 11. 2-9).

During five of the approximate seven

years of their marriage, Dr. Wilson's father stayed with
them for one month at a stretch.

His mother and brother were

also accustomed to staying with them.

In each instance,

Respondent assisted in making their stay comfortable and
pleasant (Green TR. 17, 11. 14-21).
In his statement of facts

(Brief of Appellant, 4),

Appellant paints a picture of a husband who tirelessly slaved
away at work while his wife loafed in the fruits of his labors.
He states:

"During the course of their marriage, Defendant

worked unceasingly.

Through his diligent efforts, he was

able to accumulate the property which forms part
subject matter of this appeal."

Ibid.

o~

the

On the other hand,

he describes Respondent as one who ''never worked during the
marriage despite the fact that Defendant had encouraged her
to do so on numerous occasions.

*** Plaintiff contributed

absolutely nothing of a monetary nature to the accrual of
the estate of Plaintiff and 8efendant."

Id. 3,4.
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~his description of the circumstances of this narri-

age as well as the expectations that each party had
for the other is unfair and inaccurate insofar as it implies
that Respondent idled away her time and failed to meet an
existent need to assist in generating income for their
support.

The record is clear that the financial position

of these parties from the outset of their marriage was such
as to never reasonably require a second income in order to
financially stay afloat.

Appellant's own testimony as quoted

from his Brief (Brief of Appellant, 4) is indicative of the
fact that any recommendation or conversation he may have had
with 11rs. Wilson with respect to her finding employment was
for the sole purpose of providing her a diversion from her
household chores.

He stated, for example,

enough to occupy her time."

Ibid.

"She did not have

Additional income would

certainly have only added to his tax burden.
Absent the need to provide additional income, 11hich
potentially on the part of Plaintiff would have been miniscule
in comparison with the income generated by Dr. Nilson,
~espondent

elected to attend to her household chores and apply

her time in endeavors other than pursuing a gainful avocation.
~o

have retrained herself in her field of training as an x-ray

technician, as ~ppellant allegedly recommended, 1vould have
~equired her to co~pletely dedicate herself to total retraining
inas~uch as some 20 years had passed since she was involved in
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that rapidly changing area of expertise.

(Red TR. 48 11. 26-29).

The heavy commitment required by such an undertaking on the
part of Plaintiff was simply greater than the need and interest
at the time.
Nith respect to the property distribution and award
of alimony made by the trial court, it should be noted that the
decision was not rendered until after the trial judge took
the matter under advisement for careful consideration following three days of trial, the greatest portion of which was
dedicated to the facts relating to the extent, nature and
distribution of the marital estate and those issues regarding
alimony.
1977.

The third and final day of trial was February 11,

The court made its minute entry lvith respect to property

distribution and alimony on April 19, 1977

(R. 125), and

the appropriate Decree of Divorce as to Property Distribution
was signed and entered on r1ay 6, 1977, •,;herein the court al•iarded
alimony to the Respondent in the monthly sum of $900.00, which
is less than 11 per cent of Defendant's

mont~ly

income, and

ordered that the marital estate be distributed as
after set forth.

her~i~-

Respondent was awarded property valued at

$90,744.00, whereas Appellant was awarded prooerty valued
at S206,801.65 or S232,801.65, dependinq upon whether one
includes the S26,000.00

withdra~m

by the doctor- for '1::.:: c·m
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personal needs from the parties'
dency of the action.

joint account during the pen-

Appellant is of the opinion that payment

of said S26,000.00 with $20,000.00 to Defendant's brother and
the S6,000.00 to the educational trust was made pursuant to
his legitimate debts and obligations and that, consequently,
it should not be considered as a part of the marital estate
but should be offset against the value of his assets he brought
into this marriage.
The valuation of the property distribution which
follows differs from that described in Appellant's Brief
(Brief of Appellant, 6-9).

The discrepancy is a function

of several omissions and errors made by Defendant in calculating the value of property awarded to each party.

Although,

for example, Appellant announces that he used and accepted
Pespondent's valuations in preparing his statement, in
several instances this is simply not the case.

I~

each

instance wherein there is a discrepancy of this nature,
appropriate references are made in this brief to the trial
record to verify the same.
one item twice

Furthermore, Appellant counted

(the stoneware) in his schedule of property

a•,arded to Respondent and omitted to mention tHo items of
property awarded to himself valuing in excess of $16,500.00
(cold and silver coin collection and 1976 Toyota Land Cruiser).
~ith

that explanation, consider the specifics of the property

~istri~ution

ordered by the trial court in this ~atter.
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PROPERTY JIJ,IARDED TO PLAINTIFF
Item

Value

A.

Condominium
(Plaintiff's
residence)

B.

Unimproved lots
in North Carolina

C.

Plaintiff's
automobile

6,200.00

D.

Diamond ring

4,200.00

E.

Furniture in
condominium with
the exception of those
items specifically
awarded to Defendant

6,544.00 1

$78,000.00

Comments
Red TR. 36, 11. ll-18;
P. F:x. 1!15

12,000.00

Green TR. 18, 11. 1-6
Red TR. 71, 11. 23-23;
#13

P. Ex.

F.

Stoneware

included in "E"
above

G.

Men's chest and
corner table

included in "E"
above

H.

Cash

2,000.00

!.

Personal items
(including jewelry)

no value

Appellant counted
this item twice
Brief of Appellant,
6' 7

$90,744.00

1calculated as follows:
A.
2.

Total value of personal property in
condomium as per Plaintiff (P. Ex. 113)
S 3,316.00
Less household goods awarded Appellant
and included in cn~putation of A
(flatware - $62.00; goblets - $50.00;
elates - SlS.OO; fishtrap ~ables - $20.00;
stool - SlS.OO; chairs - $300.00; etagere S3JO.OO; lamp- S~O.GO; t;ooi:case- $1,000.00) (1,772.00)
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PROPERTY AWARDED TO DEFENDAclT

Item

Value

A.

Interest in profitsharing trust

B.

Partnership
interest

30,000.00

Computed by Appellant's
own accountant

c.

Interest in
professional
corporation

15,636.73

Although this includes
Appellant's MercedezBenz automobile, it does
not include his 1976
'C'oyota Land Cruiser

D.

Cattle

E.

Rocks and equipment

10,635.00

F.

Ranch

10,000.00

,..u .

ll.

Cottomvood Club
membership

Gold and silver coins

$100,000.00

ColT\J!lents
'C'his value was computed
by Appellant's own attorney retained to manage
said trust.
Red TR.
29' ll. 25-28.

6,200.00

1,500.00

lCl, 000.00

Base replacement cost.
Red TR. 76, 11. 16-13;
Appellant claims that
its cash value if sold is
$1,000.00 because of the
$400.00 transfer fee -inasmuch as Appellant
does not intend to sell
it, however, its value
to him is what he would
have to pay to replace
it, e.g. $1,500 - $2,000.

n. 83; P. Ex. 415;
Appellant omitted to
include this in his
computation (Brief of
Appellant 7-8.)

:-'oun t3.in lot
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J.

House trailer

K.

Sheep horns

L.

Fish trap tables

150.00

Appellant's own
estimate. D. Ex. #32

M.

Bronze goblets,
plates and flat>vare

300.00

Appellant's own
estimate

:1.

:1oney in bank

2,531.91

At time this action
was filed, the amount
was $28,531.92 -- during
the pendency of this
action Appellant withdrew $26,000.00 -$20,000.00 of which went
to App6lant's brother;
remainder of $6,000.00
was placed in trust
for his children by
former marriage.

0.

Appellant's
automobile
(1976 Toyota Land
Cruiser)

6,500.00

Green TR. 62, 11. 27-29;
Appellant omitted to
include this item in
his computation (Brief
of Appellant, 7-8)

P.

Suede chairs

800.00

D.

Q.

Etagere

450.00

D. Ex.

:1..

Bookcases

s.

Filing drawer, desk,
naugahyde stool and
lamp

T.

700.00
No value

2,000.00

D.

Ex. 1!32
!!32

Ex. !' 3 2

Included in corporate
assets of 515,636.73.
".

83

1976 tax refund less
9,399.00
S2,000.00 to Respondent
E'ersonal items

:Jo value
$20G, 801.65
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:Jo statement of facts in an appeal of this nature
would be complete without mention of the parties' respective
prospects for the future.

Appellant ">ill continue to enjoy

the benefits, income and comforts

ge~,r~ted

which was built during the course of

t~is

by the practice

marriage.

His

annual income which is now in excess of $100,000.00 increased
over the last seven years some 400 per cent, and there is
no reason to believe that its potential for the future is
not equally promising.

He was also awarded other income-

producing assets which have the potential of substantially
supplementing his professional salary.

~ot

only does he

have the security of substantial income at present, but the
court provided him with the means for complete security at
the time of his retirement or in the event of disability by
awarding him his interest in a professional pension currently
valued at $100,000.00 which was created and contributed to
during the course of this marriage.
Dr. Wilson continues to pursue the same career and
do the same work which he did prior to his separation and
divorce from

~rs.

Wilson.

He is a highly trained individual

who can continue his present lifestyle without any sicrnificant
adjustf:1.ent.

Indeed, this divorce seerr.s to r.a V>"

needs "ery well, inasmuch as he has promptly
~or who~

he was willing to sacrifice his

~ · •i ':e:

~~rried

~arriaae

his

~~e ~oman

with

"'.esr.:JOndent.
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Respondent's prospects, on the other hand, present
a completely different set of circumstances.

Whereas this

divorce has hardly given Dr. Wilson cause to miss a step in
his present lifestyle, Respondent must now carve out an entirely
new way of life.

Unlike Dr. Wilson, she is not presently

trained for immediate employment in any field; in fact, 20 years
have passed since she last found involvement in her field
of training, which by nature is subject to rapid and dynamic
advances and changes.

lfuereas Appellant was awarded assets

of an income-producing nature, no such asset was awarded
to Respondent, leaving her to her own ingenuity to get along
in life henceforth.

lfuereas Dr. Nilson has security for retire-

ment and/or disability, no such security was built in to
l·trs. Nilson's award of property.

In short, she not only has

lost the happiness and security of her marriage

an~

husband

to their closest friend's wife, but now faces a total
adjustment to life in order to adequately support herself
and her children.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE
EVIDENCE &~D SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT TO
CORRECT ANY MANIFEST INEQUITIES RESULTING
FROM THE DECISION BELOW, THE TRIAL JUDGE
IN A DOMESTIC MATTER HAS CONSIDERABLE
LATITUDE OF DISCRETION IN ADJUSTING THE
FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY INTERESTS OF THE
PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT. HIS ACTIONS ARE
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT AND VALID AND MAY
NOT BE UPSET OR MODIFIED ON APPEAL UNLESS
THE RECORD CLEARLY DISCLOSES Ta~T THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECREE WAS SO PLAINLY ARBITRARY AS TO SHOW A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHICH WORKS A MA.~IFEST INJUSTICE OR INEQUITY.
While it is true that in a divorce action, or in
any other equitable action for that matter, the Supreme Court
may review the evidence, make findings and substitute its
judgment for that entered below, such action of superseding
the considered decision of the trial judge, who is in the
best position to arrive at a just and equitable result,
is rather drastic in nature and should not be lightly undertaken.

In divorce actions, as well as in any other kind of

appeal, the decision of the lower court is endowed with a
presumption of validity and correctness, and the Appellant
shoulders the heavy burden of overcoming that presumption.
The wide breadth of discretion, which it is
the trial judge's prerogative and responsibility to exercise,
is absolutely necessary in a di'Jorce action for tHo reasons.
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First, there is no fixed formula that can be applied in any
two cases which will produce a just and equitable result
in both instances.

The number of facts, and their respective

degrees of importance, that come into play differ substantially from case to case.

Each case must turn on its own facts.

It follows that the second reason for indulging the
trial court with its considerable latitude of discretion
is that no one is in a better position that the trial jucge
to evaluate the credibility of evidence and testimony, to
weigh the variables involved in each case, and to arrive at
a decision that will approximate fairness and justice as
closely as can be accomplished in these kinds of cases.
Lawlor v. Lawlor, 121 Ut. 201, 240 P.2d 271 (1952).
Because there is no fixed formula or anything more
definite than general guidelines, and because the trial judge
is in the best position to fairly allocate

financia~

and

property interests in a civorce action, his judgment should not
be upset or modified for the reason that those sitting on the
Supreme Court may have decided to cut up the pie in different
proportions.

Otherwise, the trial judge would, in fact, have

little or no discretion in such matters.

~his

court stated

not so many years ago:
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Even though our constitutional provisions,
Section 9 of Article VIII, states that
in equity cases this court may review the
facts, vle nevertheless take into account
the advantaged position of the trial judge.
Accordingly, we recognize that it is his
prerogative to judge the credibility of
the witnesses, and in case of conflict, we
assume that the trial court believed the
evidence which supports the findings.
We
review the whole evidence in the light
most favorable to them; and we will not
disturb them merely because this court
m~ght have VLewed the matter dLfferently
but only if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings.
For similar reasons, the trial court is
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of
discretion in determining what order should
be made in such matters; and we will not
upset his judgment and substitute our own
unless it clearly appears that the trial
court abused its discretion or misapplied
the law.
[Citations omitted.]
Stone v.
Stone, 19 Ut.2d 378, 431 P.2d 802 (1967)
(Emphasis added) .
The following are a few examples of innumerable cases
supporting the principles just stated:
563 P.2d 184

(Ut. 1977)

Naylor v.

~aylor,

(in matters of divorce the trial judge

has considerable latitude of discretion in the disposition of
property.

His judgment should not be disturbed unless it

works a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a

~

abuse of discretion); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Ut. 1975)
(trial court has considerable latitude -- burden on appellant
~o

show misunderstanding or nisapplication of law resulting in

substantial or prejudicial error or that the evidence must
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clearly preponderate against the findings or that serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest clear abuse of discretion);
Mitchell v. Hitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Ut. 1974)

(the trial judge '

has considerable latitude of discretion); Nhitehead v. Whitehead,:
16 Ut.2d 179, 397 P.2d 987 (1965)

(trial judge must be allowed

wide latitude of discretion in matters relating to alimony -his decision should not be changed unless evidence shows manifes:
inequity and injustice).
This standard of review on appeal in a divorce action
has found expression in many different forms.

This court has

stated in numerous decisions that it
. . . will not substitute its judgment in a
divorce proceeding relative to alimony and
division of property for that of the trial
court unless the record clearly discloses
that the trial court's decree in such matters
is plainly arbitrary. Allen v. Allen, 109
Ut. 99, 165 P.2d 872 (1946) (Emphasis added.);
see also Noolley v. Woolley, 113 Ut. 391,
195 P.2d 743 (1948).
On other occasions, the court has stated that it
will not upset or modify the decision of the trial court in
a divorce action unless the appellant proves that the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings and decree, that
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of law resultina
in substantial prejudicial error, or that serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (1977); Harding v. Harding,
26 !Jt. 2d 277' 488 p. 2d 308

(19 71).
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The most commonly used term in characterizing this
standard of review is "plain" or "clear abuse of discretion".
"Abuse of discretion" has been defined by the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia as meaning "action which is arbitrary,
fanciful or clearly unreasonable."
F.2d 695, 697.

U.S. v. McWilliams, 163

In a domestic matter involving the issue of

child support, the Court of Appeals of Arizona made reference
to another case in which the Supreme Court of Arizona stated
that "for an abuse of discretion to exist, the record must be
devoid of competent evidence to support the decision."
Platt, 17 Ariz. App. 458, 498 P.2d 532 (1972).
the Michigan

Platt v.

And, finally,

Supreme Court has stated that "abuse of discre-

tion" for purposes of appellate review requires that the
result be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic
that it evidences not exercise of will, but perversity of
will; not exercise of judgment, but defiance thereof; not
exercise of reason, but rather passion and bias.

Wendel v.

Swanbera, 384 Mich. 468, 185 N.W.2d 348, 351.
By no flight of the imagination can it be reasonably
said that the actions of the trial court in this case were arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.

On the basis of this

record, one could not seriously contend that the decision of the
trial court is so palpably and grossly viclative of fact and
logic that it evidences a perversity of will, defiance of judgrent and bias, nor can it be shown that the record is devoid of
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It should also be mentioned again in this reqard
that difference in judicial opinion is not tantamount to
"abuse of judicial discretion".

Hamilton v. U.S., 31 A.2d 887,

889.
Appella~t

asserts that this court "often substitutes

its judgment for that of the trial court in alimony and properey
distribution matters"

(Brief of Appellant, 11).

He follows

with a "partial listing" of authorities in support of that
proposition (Ibid.), makes passing reference to "circumstances"
of those cases which warranted a modification of the trial
court's judgement, and concludes "in the present case, those
same circumstances exist and the trial court's decree should
be modified"

(Id. 12).

To assert that the circumstances of

fact presented by this appeal are the "same" as those existing
in cases referred to by .Z\ppellant is an unhelpful and somewhat
inaccurate generalization.

The combination of facts existina

in each case of this nature is unique and sufficiently

dissimil~

frcm others as to defy the utility of any generalizations or
fixed formulas.

By way of illustration brief reference is here

made to cases cited by Appellant in his Brief on Pages 11 and 1:
in support of his proposition just stated.
Appellant first cites Dubois v. Dubois,
504 P.2d 1380

~9

Ct.2d 75,

(1973) and reports that this court dislllowed

alimony awarded by the trial cc·-.:rt.

":hile t~at is tr·~e, .'·.ppe::.
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fails to mention that the basis of this court's holding was that
the wife was awarded approximately 60 per cent of the marital
estate valuing $588,581.00 (almost double that of the estate
presently before the court) along with attorney's fees in the
sum of $10,000.00.

Among the property awarded to the wife v1ere

assets of an income-producing nature which the court concluded
would provide her with sufficient income "

.to maintain her

in the manner to which she is accustomed without periodic payments
from the Defendant."

In the present case, however, Respondent

was awarded no assets of an income-producing nature, and even
with the decree as it now stands Respondent will not be able
to maintain herself "in the manner to which she is accustomed."
It should be noted in this regard that the three lots in
~orth

Ca!olina which were part of the court's award to her

are unimproved, non-income-producing properties.
In the next case,
202, 331 P.2d 821

~1artinett

v, 11artinett, 8 Ut. 2d

(1958), Appellant accurately reports that this

court modified the property distribution made thereon.

Here,

again, however, the facts are substantially dissimilar to those
now before the court.

The marital estate then in question was

comparatively small and consisted of a farm, two houses and
some personal property.

Virtually all of the estate vas awarded

to the wife except the husband was given a one-half interest
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in the smaller of the two homes.

Furt!-lermore, unlike the •,,•ife

who was healthy and working, and 15 years his junior, he was
of poor health, unable to work and 67 years old.
"11y heart, wind, and legs are gone.

He testified

I am waiting to die."

This court properly concluded that under the circumstances
he should have been awarded one of the two homes in which he
could reside.
In Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P. 2d 525

(Ut. 1976), this

court reviewed the trial court's denial to decrease alimony
because of change in circumstances.

Although this court

did take action to reduce the alimony award from $300.00 a
month to Sl.OO, the stated reasons for so holding were that
the wife had made no claim that alimony was necessary for her
support, and that at that particular time, eight years after
the divorce, she had received both B.A. and '1.A. dearees and
\vas working.

It should also be mentioned parenthetically

that the original award of alimony which stood for

~any

years in the sum of $300.00 a month was 23 per cent of her
husband's income at the time of the divorce ($1,300.00 a
month).

In the present case, Respondent is in definite need

of the alimony support as ordered which constitutes less than
11 per cent of Appellant's current salary.
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In Hampton v. Hampton, 80 Ut. 570, 47 P.2d 419
(1935), appellant filed a petition for the reduction of
alimony paid to his former wife.

The trial court ordered a

reduction in alimony and the appellant appealed on the grounds
that it had not been reduced enough.

This court took action

to further reduce the alimony from $54.00 per month to S45.00.
It is interesting to note, however, that at the time of the
original divorce, the appellant therein earned $2,100.00
annually, and the court ordered him to pay $60.00 a month
alimony to his former wife, which amounted to over 34 per
cent of his monthly income.

The appellant paid alimony

as ordered for some five years at which time his annual
salary had decreased to $1,500.00, and yet, even with this
court's reduction, alimony of $45.00 a month still constituted
36 per cent of his income.

Appellant in the case presently

before the court dwells on the amount of alimony awarded to
Respondent but fails to place that in the proper context of
relating it to his income (less than 11 per cent).
Although this court made a modification in the
alimony in 'vilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956),
recognition was given to the fact that the wife was awarded
substantially all of the property possessed by the parties
to the marriage, including two homes, stock and bank accounts.
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This court stated that although alimony in the sum of $50.00
per month was insufficient for Respondent's support, the assets
awarded to her, if well managed, would produce supplemental
income.

Again, in the present case, Respondent 1vas not awarded

assets of an income-producing nature.
Appellant does not assign any specific error,
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law to the trial
judge except to say that he thinks the court simply made
the wrong decision in not awarding to him a bigger slice
of the pie.

In light of the fact that the dissolution of

this marriage was borne of his desire to leave Respondent
for another woman, Justice Crockett's comments in Hilson, supra,
seem to fit the circumstances of this case as well:
From the decree awarding the plaintiff
the divorce, the defendant appeals.
He
does not attack the part of the decree
granting the divorce; on the contrary,
it seems to suit his designs very well.
He asked plaintiff to secure a divorce
for the reason that he was involved with
a certain r1rs. H. and 1vanted to marry
her.
Notwithstanding the fact that the
divorce was indispensable to his plans,
he seems to have desired, not unnaturally,
to be released from the bonds of matrimony at the least possible economic
disadvantage to himself.
The court requested counsel for both parties in
this matter to submit supporting memoranda of law on t'"'O differ·
ent occasions

(Defendant's '!er..orandurn R. 81-92; 'lemorandum of
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Law submitted by Defendant R. 93-98; Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum R. 99-109; Plaintiff's c·1emorandum R 110-122).
court no doubt perused the four briefs submitted.

The

In short,

the trial judge did everything that could have possibly been
done to put himself in the best position to make an informed
and objective decision in a very difficult kind of case in which,
by its nature, no one really wins.

It is virtually inevitable

in a case of this nature that one and probably both of the
parties will be dissatisfied.
Appellant is asking this court to re-examine the
tangible evidence that makes up the record and supersede the
decree of the trial judge who observed the witnesses, weighed
the conflicting evidence and entered a decree which in his
judgment and discretion was as fair and equitable as can be
made under the circumstances of this case.

This court should

not succumb to the temptation of re-doing what has already
been carefully done without finding that the trial judge's
actions were plainly arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable; and that conclusion simply cannot be reasonably derived
from this case.
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Point II
'I'HE TRIAL COURT'S ADJUSTHENT OF THE FINANCIAL
AND PROPERTY I~TERESTS OF THE PARTIES lvAS
FAIR AND EQUITABLE.
A.
APPELLANT'S STATEHE:-IT OF FACTS WITH
RESPECT TO THE EXTENT, VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION
OF THE HARITAL ESTATE IS PARTIALLY IN ERROR
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, CREATES THE ILLUSION THAT
APPELLANT WAS AIVARDED LESS AND RESPONDENT
~lORE THA;:< WHAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTUALLY
AWARDED IN ITS DECREE.
Appellant's description and evaluation of the
proportionate interest in the marital estate awarded to
each party by the lower court is incorrect on eight separate
counts.

This inaccuracy tends to create the appearance that

Appellant was awarded less, and the Respondent more, than
what the trial court actually ordered.
First, although the marital estate included three
automobiles, Appellant's Statement of Facts accounts for
only two

(Brief of Appellant 6-8).

The two vehicles recognized

by .'\ppellant are the automobile awarded to Respondent and
the :lercedes-Benz which went to .'\ppellant as part of his
interest in the professional corporation (Brief of Appellant,
7, fn.

25).

A 1976 Toyota Land Cruiser was awarded to

hovle'Jer, in addition to the '1ercedes-Benz

Appell~:

(R. 125, 130).

That vehicle was valued by ;\ppellant to be worth approximately
$6,500.00

(Green TR. 62 11. 17-29).

coin collection" valuec by hire: to !.:>e worth S:'.O,OO() •.)O

1:::.
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as reflected by the court's minute entry order (R. 125).
Appellant omits to include this asset in his schedule of
assets entitled "Property Awarded Defendant" on pp. 7 and 8
of his Brief.

In all fairness,

this oversight is under-

standable, inasmuch as it was inadvertently omitted from
the Decree of Divorce as to Property

~istribution

(R. 129),

although the court specifically intended that Appellant receive
it as reflected in the previously referenced minute entry order.
Notwithstanding this oversight, inasmuch as Appellant does in
fact

have control and possession of said asset, and

inas~uch

as the court intended that he receive it, it should be
included in that portion of the marital estate awarded to
him.
Third, in his description of "Property Awarded
Plaintiff" on pp. 6 and 7 of his Brief, Appellant inadvertently double counted the item "stoneware" valued at 5400.00,
inasmuch as it was entered separately as "Item E" and was also
included as "Item F" as well.
Fourth, as more fully explained hereinafter,
Respondent contends that Appellant is attempting to unfairly
minimize the value of his interest in the pension trust
awarded to him and valued at $100,000.00, by substracting
therefrom one-half that areount which allegedly would have
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to be paid in income taxes if he were to, hypothetically,
cash out his interest today (Brief of .'\ppellant, 9, fn.
Fifth, Appellant contends that Respondent "

38, 17),
. . has

not brought any significant property into the marriage whereas
the Defendant brought into the marriage assets of a value
exceeding $20,000.00"

(Brief of Appellant, 14).

Appellant

assumes a rather incongruous posture by contending that he
contributed assets in excess of $20,000.00 at the outset of
their marriage without accounting for the concurrent offsetting
debts and obligations which he brought to the marriage as well. ,
As previously mentioned, during the pendency of this action,
Appellant drained the marital estate of some $26,000.00 for the
purpose of liquidating completely one debt of $20,000.00 and
partially contributing to a continuing obligation in the sum
of $6,000.00.

~fuen

Appellant's pre-marital assets are offset

by his pre-marital debts and obligations, it is evident that
he entered this marriage with a negative net worth, whereas
Respondent contributed assets of value and was at least debtfree.

At the very least, if those obligations are not

of~set

against the value of Appellant's pre-marital assets, they
should be included in his share of the marital estate as
awarded by the trial court.
Sixth, on p.

5 of his Erie£, !,ppe:!.lant iterc'izes

the bills oaid and support

pro~ided

separation to the time of trial.

~espondent

~ro~

Appellant then

the tirre

procee~~

•:

add by
t:'lat
arr,ount
to the
of provided
'\espo:-.c'e:c.t'
propert·/
'~' :r:'
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(Brief of Appellant, 9).

-

This maneuver is highly im9roper.

Such expenditures for support and payment of bills legitimately
incurred during the course of marriage should not be included
in the marital estate, especially in light of the fact that
Appellant failed to provide equal treatment by adding to the
value of his property award monies expended in his own behalf
and for his own support during the pendency of this action as
well.

The effect of this maneuver, as well as others herein

described, is to unfairly inflate and exaggerate the value
of what Respondent was awarded by the trial court.
Seventh, Appellant states "Plaintiff contributed
absolutely nothing of a monetary nature to the accrual of the
estate of Plaintiff and Defendant"

(Brief of Appellant, 4).

Nhile it is true that over the years Respondent's monetary
contribution to the marital estate in comparison to that
made by Appellant is insignificant; to conclude, however,
that the bread and butter provider of a marriage should
be awarded the bulk of the estate simply because he Horks
out of the home for gain while his wife works inside the home
for free gives no value to the faithful and valuable, albeit
non-~onetary

contribution made by a wife and homemaker and is

grossly unfair.

Such a narrow-minded view has undoubtedly

played a role in giving birth to the current movement among
~o~en to lea~e the home and find recoanition elsewhere.
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Respondent was not gainfully employed during the
course of the marriage primarily because their financial circumstances did not require it and, whatever conversation these
parties may have had with respect to her becoming engaged in
a gainful avocation was only born of the concern to provide
her with some diversion from her wifely chores and variety
in life.

She should not now be punished for electing to

pursue the life of a housewife and for doing the very things
she undertook to do when she took the marriage vows to be
a wife.
In lVoolley v. lVoolley, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
gave clear recognition of a woman's contribution to a marriage
in her capacity as a homemaker by awarding her an interest in
the potential future income of her husband.
If the money invested in the mining
ventures has been earned by the efforts
of defendant in his profession, the
efforts of the wife and mother in
taking care of the home and children
have assisted defendant in his accumulation. Accordingly, she should not
be denied her share of any increase
in value that may result in the future.
Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held
that a wife engaged only in domestic activities is, nevertheless, entitled to a division of the ffiarital property in a
divorce proceeding.
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The efforts of the respective parties
in accumulating wealth is one of many
factors that are relevant in the division
of the marital partners' property [Citation] and sizable property awards to a
wife have been approved without mention
of whether the wife directly added to
the accumulation of wealth. [Citations.]
It is well established that a wife's
housekeeping labors are a factor to be
considered in dividing property . . . .
These services are necessary to the
maintenance of a civilized lifestyle.
Reicrer v. Christensen, 529 P.2d 1362
(C.A.Colo. 1974).
In Marzique v. Marzique, 356 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir.,
1966), the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia stated:
Where jointly held property is
involved, and the evidence shows that
the husband contributed the bulk,
if not all, of the funds for the
purchase thereof, the wife's interest
is deemed to be conditioned on her
faithful performance of the marriage
vows.
[Dictum.]
Eighth, it is the prerogative of the trial judge
to judge the credibility of witnesses and evidence, and,
in the case of conflict, the Supreme Court must assume that
the trial court believed the evidence which best supports
its findings; consequently, this court should view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
findings.
Carter,

Stucki v. Stucki, 562 P.2d 240 (Ut. 1977); Carter v.

~;

Stone v. Stone,

~·

As indicated at

the
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appropriate places in this brief, values assigned to certain
assets in the marital estate differ as between these parties.
Respondent submits that the values used by Appellant are not
exclusively those which best support the court's findin('!s, '"hil!
those used in this brief are most in keeping with the rule of
review just stated.
In each case of this nature, consideration must be
given to numerous factors.

In no case do all factors favor

one party at the complete exclusion of the other.

Nor does

the degree of importance or emphasis required by each factor
remain constant from one case to another.

Of the myriad of

factors that could potentially come into play in

allocati~g

the financial and property interests of the parties to a

1

a~vorce 1

action, Respondent submits that those enumerated immediately
Fault:

It has long been recognized by this court

that although no firm rule can be uniformly applied in all
divorce cases, a court may, and invariably does, consider the
relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their
vows and th8ir relative guilt or innocence in causina

~2rriace
t~e

break-up of the marriage in formulating the divorce decree
property distribution.

Searle v . .c:earle, 522 P.2d :097

a~c

(1974):

Dubois v. Dubois, supra; \Vilson v. 'Vilson, supra; ··1 A.cC'onald '·'·
~1acDonald,

120 Ut. 573, 236 P. 2d 1066

92 Ut. 255, 57 P.2d 265

(l9Sl); Pinior. ··. Pir.ioc..

(1936) . .>.c:-:1itteC:ly this is -o': '::Oe
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only factor that should be given consideration in this case,
and Respondent does not seek to have Appellant unfairly penalized;
but, by the same token, she should not have to suffer or be punished
for Appellant's actions in breaking up the marriage.

The record

clearly reflects that Appellant would not consider reconciliation
and simply wanted out of their marriage in order to marry another
~lOman.

.l\.nd yet, Appellant now asks this court to substantially

reduce his obligation of partial support to Respondent and give
him a further portion of the estate awarded to her by overruling
the order of the trial judge who gave judicious consideration
to all factors here involved.
Current and Potential Income:

It is also well-

established that the court should consider, in addition to the
relative guilt or innocence of the parties, their present and
potential incomes.

''lilson v. lvilson,

~·

Appellant is

fortunate to have a lucrative and promising career which has
developed over the course of this
o~

~arriage.

Over that period

time, Appellant's income has multiplied 400 per cent and

has every indication of continuing to increase in the future.
Social Position and Standard of
relevant

~actor

~ivina:

Another

is the social position and standard of livina

enjoyed by the parties during the course
:;ilson •:. \•lilson, suora.

o:

thei~ ~arriage,

In the '·1acDonald case, supra, this

court statec:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

34 -

. . that where there are sufficient assets
and income to do so, she (the wife against
whom the divorce was granted on ground of
habitual intoxication) is entitled to be
provided for according to her station in
life and as demanded by her condition of
health and lack of abil~ty to work.
(Emphasis added.)
The station in life and (high) standard of living to
which the partner became accustomed during their marriage is
evident from the record.

Their affluence provided them finan-

cial freedom and security for both the present and the future.
But, even as the order of the trial court now stands, it cannot be fairly said that Respondent will be as fortunate as
Appellant in maintaining the same standard of living and comforts heretofore enjoyed by them.
!Ioney or Property Each Brouoht into the

~1arriaoe:

c1acDonald v. ;!acDonald, supra; Brief of Appellant, 13.

Notwith·

standing Appellant's self-serving assertion that \vhereas he
contributed property valuing in excess of $20,000.00, Respondent contributed nothing, the truth of the matter is that
his debts exceeded his assets at the time and he entered the
marriage with a negative net worth as heretofore explained.
The Contribution of Each in the Accumulation of
the

~!arital

Estate:

Ibid.

The assets of this marital estate

were accumulated almost exclusively during the course of this
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marriage.

Its wealth was developed as a direct result of the

joint efforts of both parties, i.e., Respondent attending to
the normal chores and duties which fall to the housewife and
Appellant in pursuing his career.
As previously stated, Respondent simply elected to
give full time and attention to fully supporting Appellant
by attending to her wifely chores and duties instead of
pursuing a gainful avocation which he supposedly encouraged
her to do in order to provide her with some diversification
of interests and activities.

Any Extraordinary Sacrifice, Devotion or Care Which
~ay

Have Been Given to the Spouse or Others, Such as t1other,

Father, Etc.:

Ibid.

As previously mentioned, during the course

of their marriage, Respondent assisted in caring for Appellant's
two sons for a period of one month each year of their marriage.
During five years Dr. Wilson's father stayed with them for
a?proximately one month on each occasion; his brother and
mother were also accustomed to staying with them.

In each

instance, Respondent assisted in making them feel welcome and
comfortable.

In addition to this, the parties enjoyed an

extensive social life during the marriage.
Finally, it should be mentioned that with respect
to the property division, Appellant received even more than
,,:hat he recommended as a fair and equitable distribution.
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In his 11emorandum of Law (R. 93), he recommended that the
marital estate be divided on a two-thirds/one-third basis
as between himself and Respondent respectively.

As

referenced in the Statement of Facts herein, Appellant received,
in fact, in excess of two-thirds of the marital estate.
B.
PLAINTIFF'S AHARD OF $2,000 CASH
HAS BASED ON EVIDENCE ~OT AVAILABLE AT
THE TIME OF TRIAL HHICH NAS PROI1PTLY
AND PROPERLY SUBI1ITTED TO THE COURT UPON
ITS DISCOVERY AND PRIOR TO THE COURT'S
!1AKING ITS FINAL ORDER.
inco~e

This issue arises out of 1976 Federal and state
tax refunds amounting to $11,399.00.
returns

The relevant income tax

(R. 121, 122) were not available to Respondent at the

time of trial, but upon their preparation by Appellant were
promptly submitted to the trial court by Respondent in conjunction

1~ith

Plaintiff's :!emorandum (R. 110).

Copies of the sa!:'e

were provided Appellant, giving him ample opportunity to

enter~

ex-parte objection to this post-trial evidence.

No such objec-

tion was made by Appellant.

inconsiste~t

He again assumes an

and unfair position by objecting to the S2,000.00 award made
to :·!rs. 1-lilson in this regard 1vi thout referrinq to the fact
that he received the balance of the refund amount of $9,?99.00.
Appellant casts himself in the role of a hypocrit in another
respect inasmuch as he also submitted post-trial evidence to
the court which he now asks this court to consider en appea!.
After the trial, Appellant

sub~itted

to the

~curt,

in

co~~~nc-
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tion with his Defendant's :lemorandum (R. 81-92), evidence which
purported to show (1) that he in fact paid approximately
$15,000.00 down on a home instead of $10,000.00
(2)

(R.9l), and

that the resale value of his membership interest in the

Cottonwood Club had a net resale value of approximately
$1,000.00 exlclusive of a $400.00 transfer fee as opposed
to a different value given at trial.

By submitting this

evidence, Appellant requested the court to extend to him the
very consideration which he now asserts was error for the
court to extend to Respondent.

Appellant, in fact, has used

the values suggested by this post-trial evidence in his
Statement of Facts on appeal.
C.
APPELLANT'S PENSION-TRUST FUND WAS
PROPERLY VALUED, AND IH A..l':JY EVEclT HIS ASSIGN~ENT OF ERROR IN THIS REGARD IS IMPROPERLY
RAISED ON APPEAL.
Appellant's argument that his interest in the

tr~st

fund should be valued at $50,000.00 rather than 5100,000.00
because he allegedly would have to pay $50,000.00 in income
taxes if he were to terminate the tr~st today, is devoid of
merit, and is without any

fo~ndation

in the evidence.

Appellant

did not offer any evidence at trial either as to the potential
income tax consequences of cashing out of the trust or as to his
intention of terminating the trust.

Its value was established

by Appellant's own attorney retained for the purpose of ~anaain9
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(Red TR. 29, 11. 13-24; 31, 11. 11-14).

Appellant offered

no evidence to contradict that which established the value of
$100,000.00.
Appellant is asking this court to take into consideration a hypothetical situation (i.e., the consequences of his
terminating the trust at the present time).

Appellant has not

offered any evidence to show that he intends to cash out of
this trust nor has he offered any legal authority in support
of his argument in this regard.

It is improper for him to

now request this court to take into consideration the possible
consequences of an action that he obviously has no intention
of taking.

The facts are that the trust was established to

provide for retirement or disability and for that purpose its
value to Appellant is $100,000.00.

Point III
RESPONDENT'S A\~ARD OF ALH10NY IS NOT
ABSOLUTELY PEP11ANENT AND, Itl COHPARISON
TO DEFENDANT'S INCOI1E AND EARNING POTE~l
TIAL, IT IS EXTREJ.1ELY HODEST.
With respect to the award of alimony, Appellant claim
that the trial court ordered him to pay too much for too long.
As to the first half of this contention, he refers to the arro~:
of alimony awarded in the abstract without placing it in the
proper context in relation to his earnings from his medical
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practice, nor does he fairly take into consideration the
standard of living enjoyed by each of these parties during
the course of their marriage.

Although Appellant's ability

to maintain that same standard of living is virtually unimpaired,
Respondent faces considerably greater difficulties in this
regard.
Appellant refers to the fact that during the course
of this litigation Respondent submitted a list of her monthly
expenses on two different occasions.

The first itemization

showed monthly expenses in the sum of $598.00 (Red TR. 68; D.
8x. #29). The second itemization of monthly expenses was submitted
at the time of trial and showed a total of $842.00 (P. Ex. #16).
Appellant, of course, notes the discrepancy and suggests to
this court that the more modest figure is what Respondent, in
fact, requires for her support.

He fails to account for Respondent's

testimony at trial, however, wherein she explained that the
discrepancy arose simply because she miscalculated and underestimated her monthly expenses on the first occasion, thus the
need for the second itemization submitted at trial.

Respondent

testified, for example, as follows:
Q.

Now, you made an estimate earlier, did
you not, about $600.00 at the time we
had a preliminary hearing?

A.

Yes, sir.
But that was much underestimated.
It cost r:lore than I thought.
(Red 'I'R. 68, 11. 5-8.)
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Had Respondent accurately assessed her monthly
expenses on the first occasion, that particular itemization
would have been used at trial and there would have been no
need to prepare and submit a second one.
Those factors and considerations previously mentioned
with respect to the distribution of property are relevant to
the award of alimony as well; thus, there is no need to retravel that territory here,

It should be mentioned,

however, that this Respondent has found no case either in
Appellant's Brief or from research that supports Appellant's
contention that the needs of the spouse and the duration of the
marriage are the two factors of "paramount importance"

(Brief

of Appellant, 19) with respect to the a\·lard of alimony.

In

reality the two factors of "paramount importance" that the
trial court should, and in this case did, take into consideration with respect to determining the amount and duration of
alimony are (1) the necessities of the wife, and (2)
fina~cial

~he

ability of the husband.
Broadly speaking, the ori~cioal factors
or circumstances which govern the amount
to be allowed as permanent alimony are
the necessities of the wife and the-rlnancial ability of the husband to meet them.
Other factors have been mentioned, most of
which are merely aspects of these two
qeneral tests.
Thus, it has been said
that the court should consider the financial conditio~ of the par~ies, the capacity
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of the husband to earn, the capacity of
the wife to earn, the age, health and
general physical condition of the parties,
their social standing, and their conduct
or misconduct, especially with reference
to the question of fault in causing the
termination of the marriage.
24 Am.Jur.2d
Divorce §631, p. 750 (Emphasis added).
In the case of Hampton v. Hampton, supra, this
court stated, "The amount of alimony is !'1easured by the wife's
needs and requirements, considering her station in life, and
upon the husband's ability to pay."

(Emphasis added.)

It is important to place Respondent's "necessities"
in the context of the standard of living and kind of lifestyle
to which these parties became accustomed during the course of
their marriage.

In the abstract, "necessity" is a very

amorphous concept which provides little assistance unless
these other factors are taken into consideration.

One indivi-

dual's bare necessity is another's luxury; and in this case
as well as any other alimony should be awarded in an amount
sufficient to enable Respondent to maintain her social standi~c

or station in life.
The amount of alimony awarded should be
so apportioned as to secure to the wife
the same social standing, comforts and
luxuries of life as she would probably
have enjoyed had it not been for the
enforced separation, but care should be
taken that it does not amount to an
appropriation of the entire estate of
the l1usband.
Id., 5635, pp. 755, 756.
Proba~lv the ~ost i~oortar.t elel'1ent that
enters into the ~eterminatlon of the amo~n~
o~S.J.~he
offoraliro~y
is bythe
financial
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condition of the parties, includinq the
1ncome or earn1nq power of the husband and
that of the w1fe.
The court must take
into account the resources of the wife,
including the property awarded to her in
the divorce proceeding. Aside from the
wife's separate means or estate, the
size and productiveness of that of the
husband are important factors in determining the amount of the allowance, although
they are not to be considered without reference to whether or not the wife was of
assistance to him in accumulating the
property.
Id., §631, pp. 751, 752 (Emphasis added.)
Next to the property or resources of
which he is already possessed, consideration should be given to the husband's
earning capacit~, future prospects and
probable acquis1tion of wealth from anv
source whatever. Id., §632, p. 753 (Emphasis
added.
The second half of Appellant's argument on appeal
with respect to the issue of alimony goes to its indefinite
duration.

It should be noted in this regard that inasmuch as

all matters of this nature are made subject to the continuino
jurisdiction of the court, they are not cast in concrete, but,
rather, are subject to modification upon showing the proper
change in circumstances.

The trial court obviously took

~his

fact into consideration in making its award of alimony as
reflected in the following statement made by the trial judge
in response to an objection entered against Dr. Wilson who was:
testify as to what hethought an x-ray technician might earn:
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THE COURT: Objection sustained.
you claim for it?

wnat do

MR. SU11MERHAYS:
I claim she can qualify
without any difficulty to become an
x-ray technician, that she can earn
$750.00 a month without any difficulty.
THE COURT: Well, as soon as she starts
earning $750.00 a month, then I suppose
we would have a change of circumstances.
As of now, under her testimony, and
I don't suppose it is contradicted, it
has been 20 years since she was an x-ray
technician. She would have to take a
complete re-training.
I think I can
take her testimony in that regard in making
a decision, but what an x-ray technician
makes today seems to be immaterial and the
objection is sustained. (Green TR. 31,
11. 23-30; 32, 11. 1-6.)
Inasmuch as it is not possible to foresee or
anticipate all of the developments and changes that the future
holds for these parties, the alimony award made by the trial
court has greater potential of dealing fairly and equitably
with them than would an award imposing an arbitrary date of
termination, which would blindly cut off support without
consideration to the relevant needs and circumstances.

Under

the decree as it now stands, Appellant can petition the court
to terminate alimony when the circumstances so warrant; it is
obvious, however, that the trial court was of the opinion
that Respondent should be awarded alimony in the sum ordered
under her present circumstances.
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Appellant, understandably places emphasis on the
duration of the marriage of these parties, and while it is
recognized that it did not last half a century, it should be
noted that its termination is a direct result of the attitudes
and conduct of Appellant in desiring to scrap this marriage
for another.

Furthermore, Respondent submits that

consideratio~

should not only be given to the duration of the marriage
(which incidentally was far longer than any of those involved
in Appellant's cited cases in this regard), but consideration
should also be given to the time of life that this marriage
consumed.

At the time of its beginning Respondent was at

a station in life when the prospects for remarriage were
substantially greater at age 33 than they are now at age 42.
It takes little reflection to realize that the prospect of
finding a long and lasting relationship with another is :ar
greater for a man in middle age that it is for a woman, and,
unlike Appellant,

~espondent

had no prospect

waiti~g

in the

wings during the pendency of this action.
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?..ESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF ON APPEAL
THE JUDGHENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
AFFIR!1ED AND RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AI'TARDED
A REASONABLE ATTOR:-JEY' S FEE INCURRED n1
DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed,
and Respondent submits that there is nothing in the record
below to indicate that the trial judge abused his discretion
in entering the Decree of Divorce in any respect, and that
by virtue of this appeal, she has been put to the unnecessary
expense of having to engage the further services of legal
counsel.

Consequently, she respectfully requests this court

to award her a reasonable attorney's fee for defending this
appeal.

Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104

Kiger v. Kiger, 29 Ut.2d 167, SOG P.2d 441

(Ut. 1977);

(1973).

CONCLUSION
This court has sr.ated:
\ve believe the great weight of authority
supports the rule that a decree of the
trial court in divorce proceedings,
relative to alimony and division of property, will not be modified except when
the trial court has abused its discretion.
Otherwise, the appellate court by its
own actions would alter the purpose for
which it 11as created.
An appellate court
cannot remain a court of appeals and
invite review of every case decided by
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a lower tribunal where its judgment fails
to satisfy one or both parties to the litigation.
Woolley v. Woolley, suora.
And, it might be added, in a divorce action, more
than any other kind of litigation, the probabilities are great
~o

that one, and often both, parties will be dissatisfied.

one really wins, and an unpleasant task is simply accomplished
as best as can be done under the circumstances.

It is, never-

theless, difficult, if not impossible to divide the marital
estate in such a manner as to award each party just

~hat

each

thinks he desires or wants, and thus, the need for according
the trial judge a wide latitude of discretion in these matters.
As one considers the facts of this case, one cannot
reasonably conclude that the Appellant has been treated unfairly
and that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion.
lfuereas Jl_ppellant entered this marriage •.vith a negative net
worth, Respondent came to it debt-free and contributed assets
of practical use and value.

l'lhereas Appellant retains his

annual income in excess of $100,000.00, exclusive of alimony
and income from other sources, Respondent has monthly

ali~ony

in the sum of $900.00 which is less than ll per cent of

Appellant's income.
\'lhereas Appellant was awarded in excess of n1o-thirds
of the marital estate, which was accumulated during the course
of the marriage, Respondent was awarded less than

one-~hird.
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lffiereas Appellant was awarded properties of an incomeproducing nature, Respondent has no assets which could potentially provide a supplemental income.
lffiereas Appellant is a highly trained and skilled
individual, Respondent is not presently trained or skilled for
any particular employment and 20 years have elapsed since
she was involved in her area of expertise.

lffiereas during

the course of this marriage Appellant's earning capacity
increased 400 per cent, Respondent's earning ability substantially suffered as she attended to her husband's needs
so as to enable him to develop his practice and increase
his earning potential.
Nhereas Appellant retains the certainty of a
promising medical career, Respondent faces a doubtful future.
Whereas Appellant retains not only the present security but
security for the future in the form of the pension trust
fund which was created and contributed to during the course
of this marriage, Respondent faces an uncertain future
any such security.

wi~hout

\ffiereas Appellant has the certainty of

new companionship, Respondent faces an uncertain future in
this regard as well.
lffiereas

.~.ppellant

1-1ill no doubt be able to maintain

t:Ce same standard of living to 1-1hich both parties became
accusto~ed

during the course of this marriage, the prospects

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

48 -

for the Respondent in this regard are not so promising, and,
in fact, Appellant now asks this court to further adjust her
position downward.
While Respondent is grateful for the consideration
extended to her children by Appellant, she also notes the
care and devotion which she extended to his family as well,
in addition to fulfilling her responsibilities of a housewife.
The Appellant simply has not sustained his burden
on appeal by showing that the trial court's actions were
arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable, or that its
findings are devoid of competent evidence or violative of
fact and logic.
\\Therefore, Respondent respectfully prays this
court to affirm the decree entered below and award her a
reasonable attorney's fee incurred in defending this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
JENSEN & LEW,IS,

P. C.
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